Most contract signing protocols make use of a trusted third party (TTP) to ensure fairness. It has been shown that in the crash network model, this is inevitable. However, for stronger networks, where misbehavior is allowed but failure excluded, the necessity of a TTP has not yet been debated. We consider a strong network model, that includes reliable broadcast, bounded delays and timestamps and use it to describe a simple multiparty contract signing protocol that does not rely on a TTP. This shows that by strengthening the assumptions on the network, the transfer of trust from one dedicated server to the network is feasible. The result is commented in a more general setting of multiparty protocols and problems. The correctness of the proposed protocol for any number of participants is proven using process algebra techniques.
Introduction
Signing a contract in real life simply requires some people in a room, a pen and a piece of paper. Signing a digital contract amongst multiple partners over a network, though, requires a lot more attention and well-chosen security measures to protect against possible misbehavior or network failures. A multiparty contract signing protocol is a series of messages that, if followed precisely, implements this complex digital operation and ensures desirable properties. The most important property is fairness. In a fair protocol, either each well-behaving participant obtains the signed contract, or nobody does.
In this paper we address two issues regarding contract signing protocols. The first is the presence of a Trusted Third Party (TTP). Contract signing of parametric systems, µCRL has been used before [?,?] . The proofs presented there are however not directly comparable to ours. Other verification techniques have been applied to small scenarios of MPCS protocols [?] .
Overview We first introduce the problem of multiparty contract signing (Section 2), then our simple protocol (Section 3) together with a formal correctness proof (Section 4). We then discuss in detail the implications and challenges of transferring trust from a server to the network (Section 5), and finish with some conclusions in Section 6.
Multiparty Contract Signing
The informal idea of what constituted a multiparty contract signing protocol (MPCS protocol) and what it should achieve has broad consensus. In a nutshell, there are N participants, some possibly malicious, who should reach agreement on whether a contract that they've been negotiating will be signed or aborted. Moreover, if it is signed, all the participants should be able to show the signed contract to an outside observer, also called the verifier. Below, we describe this more formally and list the expected properties. This also indicates how such a protocol can go wrong.
Let P 1 · · · P N be N parties willing to sign a contract c and Verifier the outside observer. A MPCS protocol consists of two subprotocols:
The first starts from the individual decisions d i (sign or abort) and works towards reaching agreement. The outcome is a value out i for every player P i . This is either the signed contract, or the abort decision. The VERIFY subprotocol describes the interaction between a player and an external verifier. The verifier will examine the signed contract that P i presents and will output the decision accept only if it is a valid signed contract. Ideally, an MPCS protocol guarantees the following:
• Fairness: At the end of the protocol, either every signer obtains all the other signers' signatures on the contract, or nobody gets all the other signers' signatures.
• Timeliness: There exists some mechanism to ensure termination, both for the signing and the verification subprotocol.
• Abuse-freeness: No signer should be able to prove to an external observer that he has the power to choose between concluding the protocol successfully and aborting it.
As a malicious participant we consider a participant who does not follow the protocol, but tries to make it fail instead.
We now describe a straightforward multiparty contract signing protocol without TTP in which N participants aim to sign a contract c together. The participants are geographically distant and communicate by broadcasting messages over an asynchronous network. They know each other and it is assumed that the discussions and negotiations on c have taken place previously, outside the contract signing protocol. Every participant i is capable of constructing an unforgeable signature sign(i, x) on any binary content x. This is usually implemented via a public-key infrastructure, which is assumed to be in force here. We follow the usual blackbox interpretation of cryptography and abstract away from its details.
The network model
In order to eliminate the need for a trusted party, we strengthen the communication model. In particular, there are three key features that we require extra from the network:
• It supports reliable broadcast as communication primitive, meaning that messages don't get lost (although the order doesn't have to be preserved) and messages are delivered within a bounded delay.
• It automatically timestamps all messages with the time of the send action. A global clock is not necessary, but we do assume that there is some loose synchronization between the local clocks of the participants' hosts such that the maximum difference between two clocks is always bounded by a constant known to all participants.
• It has the capability to provide unforgeable proofs of send to anybody who places a message on the broadcast channel. Whenever participant i broadcasts a message m, the network gives back to i a timestamped proof-ofsend which is simply an unforgeable copy of the actual network message msg i, m, t .
Note that the network has no special knowledge regarding MPCS protocols. It is just generic support, for example provided by the middleware, rather than a 'consciously' participating party. For more comments on this model, see Section 5.
The protocol
We will denote broadcast by ⇒ and receiving a message by ←. The protocol for participants {P 1 · · · P N } is described in Fig. 1 . Before running the SIGN protocol, the participants establish agreement on the text of the contract c and on a value ∆ which indicates the maximum time that a participant is allowed to ponder about whether to sign or not. The value ∆ takes into account a possible skew of the local clocks.
• P i leaves the protocol when · she has successfully sent and received all the messages, or · a timeout occurs, or · she decides to abort
• the outcome of the algorithm for P i is
where
else if ∃j = i : out i,j = msg j, sign(j, c), t and (| t − t |> ∆) then reject else if ∃j : out i,j = msg j, sign(j, c), t and not valid (sign(P j , c)) then reject else accept The basic idea of the SIGN protocol is that everybody broadcasts her own signature and receives everybody else's signature. The network annotates all incoming send requests with the name of the sender and the time of send, and seals the resulting message. It also hands a copy of the actual network message to the sender. The protocol result for P i is out i , which is the sequence of signatures or timeouts of all others, plus either her own proof-of-send or an abort. A timeout occurs when more than ∆ time units have passed since broadcasting her own signature. If all goes well, every participant has in the end a list of messages containing all signatures, and a copy of her own broadcasted message to prove her commitment. This will be her signed contract.
An honest participant will first broadcast, then start receiving, and will decide in the beginning whether her personal decision is abort or not. A misbehaving participant can receive messages before broadcasting, can change her mind at any time, and can declare that a timeout happened even when this is not the case. The protocol ensures that the misbehavior is not harmful, or only harmful for the dishonest participants themselves.
In the second subprotocol, VERIFY , a presented contract (the message array out i ) is accepted only when all the messages included are timestamped within ∆ time units from i's proof-of-send (before or after) and all signatures included are correct. The verifier does not need interaction with the partic-ipants when evaluating a contract. We assume he has means to verify the digital signatures of the participants. Note that some dishonest participants who broadcast only after receiving could still end up with a valid contract. This does not violate the fairness, though.
The fairness of the protocol is guaranteed basically by the symmetry of the checks that Verifier performs. Timeliness is ensured by the bounded delay, the timeouts and the finite number of messages. Note that this protocol is not abuse-free. Also note the following possible attack: if only a subset of {P 1 · · · P N } send their signatures, a dishonest party can prove to the verifier that he has a contract with that subset of participants. This can be easily prevented by explicitly naming {P 1 · · · P N } in the body of the contract c.
Formal correctness proof
In this section we formalize the MPCS protocol of the previous section and prove its fairness for any number of participants. We use algebraic manipulation in µCRL [?], an extension of the process algebra ACP with abstract data types, to achieve this.
From the process algebraic point of view, everything is a process, or more precisely, the behavior of every system can be modeled as process. The modelling can take place at various abstraction levels. Typically, two descriptions are distinguished: a specification S pec capturing the global desired behavior of the system, and the implementation I mp, capturing as much as possible from the implementation details of the system. The typical process algebraic correctness statement is then S pec = τ I I mp, meaning that the specification is behaviourally equivalent to the implementation, after abstraction of internal communications in I. In µCRL, processes are built from atomic actions from a set Act and operators for sequential, non-deterministic and parallel composition. For any processes p and q, p + q denotes non-deterministic choice between p and q, p·q denotes their sequential composition, and p q denotes the parallel composition (defined in terms of interleaving and synchronous communication). Synchronization is governed by a communication function γ. There is also an encapsulation operator ∂ H , that forces processes to communicate, by making the actions in H act exclusively in communication. The hiding operator τ I abstracts away the actions in I. Finally, there are two special processes: δ (deadlock, the unit of +) and τ (internal action). In order to use abstract data types in a specification, a signature of multiple sorts and functions can be declared, and axiomatized by equations. Atomic actions can be parameterized with data elements, as in proof(p). To model input, the alternative choice such as x:NetMsg P (x) is used. Finally, if b is a term of data domain Bool and p and q are processes, then the conditional (p b q) is the process "p if b, else q". There is a powerful toolset that supports µCRL [?].
Protocol Formalization
All the entities involved in the protocol are processes: the participants P i , the verifier Verifier, and the communication medium Net. They are specified in Fig. 2 . We do not make a distinction between honest and dishonest participants at the level of process description. In the trace set of every process P i there are both well-behaved and bad traces. An honest participant will execute a well-behaved trace, for instance bcast(..).proof(..).deliver(..).claim(..).
The processes communicate by synchronizing on certain actions. Here are the pairs of actions, together with the result of their communication:
Because µCRL cannot model time naturally, some choices and simplifications are made. The most important is that we do not model explicitly the part where a participant is waiting for the ∆ time units to pass while collecting messages, but instead we compress it in one communication step to the network (DELIVER). It is future work to better accommodate the timestamps, possibly using the technique proposed in [?] . B, M are lists of network messages, indexed by their sender. We make use of a function sender (x) which returns the first element of the tuple x ≡ msg i, m, t . B i and M i denote the network message on the position i in the respective lists. The µCRL syntax does not allow to pass other processes as parameters. However, in order not to complicate matters with extra datatypes, we abuse the notation and write P i ({P 1 · · · P N }) for the behavior of P i when participating in a protocol with {P 1 · · · P N }.
The proof
The fairness property states that any honest participant must be able to prove to the verifier that the contract has been signed, or else no other participant should be able to do that. Without loss of generality, let P 1 be an honest participant and P 2 be one of the other N participants, honest or not. We have to prove that either the claim of P 1 is accepted, or, if the claim of P 1 is rejected, the claim of P 2 should be rejected as well. We can express this requirement as a system equivalence by hiding all actions in the system except the relevant ones (viz. accept(1), accept(2), reject(1), reject(2)) and request that what's left is equivalent to a fair behavior: and ∼ is weak bisimulation equivalence. To prove this equivalence, we first need a more general compositionality result for µCRL processes.
Lemma 4.1 Let ∼ be a congruence for all operators of µCRL. For any process P , let com(()P ) denote the set of actions of P used for synchronization with other processes. Let S, P, Q, R be any processes with A = com(S), H = com(P ) ∪ com(Q) ∪ com(R) and I = γ(A, H). Then, if γ(com(P ), com(Q)) = ∅, γ(com(R), com(Q)) = ∅, γ(com(P ), com(R)) = ∅, the following implication holds:
Proof. We rely on some of the conditional alphabet axioms from [?], namely:
Since τ I ∂ H (S||P ) ∼ τ I ∂ H (S||Q) and since ∼ is a congruence w.r.t. ||, we can 8 write
R doesn't perform any actions from I and τ I ∂ H (S||P ) doesn't either. Therefore, by axioms (CA2) and (CA4), the left side of (1) transforms as follows:
We apply the same transformation in the right-hand side:
Then, since ∼ is a congruence w.r.t. ∂ H , we further obtain
We have I∩H = ∅, thus from (CA7):
Finally, after a similar transformation on the right side, we conclude that
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We are now ready for the fairness theorem.
Proof idea. Weak bisimulation is not a congruence with respect to + and therefore, in order to be able to use Lemma 4.1, we will prove a stronger but less intuitive equation, namely:
with ∼ BB being the rooted branching bisimulation congruence and (2)+τ.reject (2))+τ.reject(1) τ.reject (2) (The silent prefixes are needed for the rooted branching bisimulation relation.) The proof proceeds along the following line:
(i) It holds that FairSystem BB ∼ BB CSign ({P 1 , P 2 }). This can be shown by automatic equivalence checking. The two sides of the equation are µCRL processes with finite (and small) state spaces. The µCRL toolset can then just perform a mechanical check that the two state spaces are indeed equivalent under the equivalence notion considered, namely rooted branching bisimulation.
(ii) It holds that ∀i CSign ({P 1 , P 2 }) ∼ BB CSign ({P 1 , P 2 , P i }). Similarly, because the processes involved are finite-state (and in fact, small), this equivalence can be checked by the toolset.
(iii) Next follows the generalization step, where we do not rely on the toolset anymore, but on equational reasoning. Suppose
By Lemma 4.1 it follows that
and, by point (ii),
We thus arrive at the equation
saying that all the messages exchanged in the network do not affect the observable activity of participants P 1 and P 2 . From point (i), the targeted result follows.
5 Discussion on the absence and presence of a TTP Above, we have shown that a reliable network model can function in place of a trusted referee in a multiparty contract signing protocol. Now, we discuss this result from several perspectives. First, we point out the differences in functionality between a TTP as used traditionally and the reliable network used here. We argue that it is difficult to relax the proposed model. Next, we present in a unified framework three problems closely related to contract signing. We speculate on a possible solution of the problems assuming a reliable network as deployed above and formulate some related challenges.
A TTP vs. a reliable network Usually [?,?,?], a TTP plays an active role in a protocol: it checks signatures, it is aware of the participants engaged, sometimes it maintains a history of contacts with the participants, etc. These operations need memory, processing power and a dedicated contract signing mediation algorithm. When a coordination architecture is used for the this purpose, we may expect that the communication is made reliable by transparent network algorithms. There may be support from sophisticated interaction mechanisms in the middleware. There may be even data storage facilities. But we cannot assume computing power available in the communication network. In particular, no awareness of the existence and activity of the protocol's participants can be assumed.
Weaker communication models?
In our search for a TTP-free contract signing protocol in a communication model that is as weak as possible, it remains unsettled what the weakest model is. We therefore have a closer look at the model of Section 3 and see whether its requirements can be relaxed.
The reliable broadcast primitive can be replaced by reliable send. The protocol would remain fair. In fact, there will be more possibilities for a dishonest player to harm herself by doing a send without to wait for the corresponding receive. On a side note, reliable channels are not such a powerful thing to ask for. In the traditional communication model one also has to assume some reliable channels hooking up to the TTP.
The time elements cannot be dropped. Without the bound on the network delay there is no way to tell whether an expected message has been sent or not. With the bounded delay in place, we know that a timeout means that the expected message has not been sent. Timestamps are necessary in order to prevent dishonest participants from holding up their signatures too long, causing honest participants to timeout and abort, leaving the dishonest parties with a validly signed contract.
The proofs of send can, in principle, be replaced by proofs of delivery to obtain a more natural communication model. This would have the advantage that not all channels need to be reliable, but only those on which the acknowledgments are sent. This scheme, however, doesn't immediately fit the broadcast primitive. Likely, it will be more complicated to analyze formally as well.
Related problems
There is a series of well-known problems that are related to contract signing, although, from a theoretical point of view, the relationship is not completely clear. These problems are fair exchange, distributed consensus and multiparty computation. Here, we define them formally, but in a minimalistic way, i.e., stripped of all unessential information like signatures, secret/public key cryptography, item descriptions etc. The participants that behave as expected are called honest, the others dishonest -regardless of whether their misbehavior is due to bad intentions or to failures. Let t be the maximum number of dishonest players (a bound a priori known). All the input values are private to the respective participants. To solve the problem means to find a terminating algorithm with the specified input/output behavior.
• Multiparty contract signing (MPCS)
Verifier is always honest and its role is just to apply the function check , which is defined on all possible outcomes.
• Distributed consensus (DC) Participants
DC is known to be impossible in the crash model, if t > N/3 or if t exceeds the connectivity degree of the communication graph [?] . On the other hand, solutions exist for the case t < 1 3 N (see [?] ).
• Multiparty computation (MC) Participants
MC has a probabilistic solution for t < 1 3 N (see [?] ).
• Multiparty fair exchange (MPFE):
Here, π is a permutation indicating how the items are to be transferred; the item owned by P π (i) is desired by and should be given to P i . In its most general form, the fair exchange problem allows every participant to obtain items from a set of other participants, not just one. The problem has no TTP-free solution already for the two-party case [?] . This has been proved by reduction of 2-party DC to 2-party FE.
Looking for the 'weakest' communication model in which the listed problems can be solved without TTP will help to clarify their relationship. For example, it is conjectured [?] , that two-party fair exchange is more difficult to solve than consensus. To prove this, it is enough to find a communication model in which consensus is possible, but fair exchange not. The model we used in this paper might be a possible answer. Consensus is solvable in this model, but, at present, we do not have a proof that MPFE is not. We also conjecture that, because of the presence of the honest verifier, MPCS is not more difficult than DC.
Conclusion
Existent non-probabilistic contract signing protocols make use of a trusted third party. The main issue addressed in this paper is the transfer of trust from a dedicated trusted third party towards a generic communication medium. We proposed a reliable communication network and a basic contract signing protocol built on top of it.
Because of the strong guarantees of the underlying communication model, our protocol has limited practical use for highly unreliable media like the Internet. There, at least for the moment, the most appropriate contract signing protocols remain the optimistic ones [?,?], which rely on the presence of a trusted party ready to be contacted in case of conflicts. However, in the context of middleware platforms, the additional network requirements on which our protocol relies may very well be met.
We have formally proved that the proposed protocol preserves fairness for any number of participants. Given the simplicity of the protocol and the strong network assumptions, this will not come as a surprise. However, the proof provides a starting point for formal verification of parametrized multiparty contract signing protocols. The techniques are promising, but need to be developed further in order to deal with less abstract, more detailed protocols that are substantially more complex.
As future work, we plan to analyze other (optimistic) MPCS protocols. The Baum-Waidner protocol [?] , for instance, is symmetric and optimistic, and therefore a convenient next target for the parametrized verification techniques proposed here. Taking inspiration in the solution for MC presented in [?], we would also like to explicitly define a MPCS protocol without TTP in the weaker communication model used there, and under the essential assumption t < 1 3 N . On the more theoretical side, it would be interesting to investigate the relations between the problems mentioned in Section 5, by identifying the communication models where they are or are not solvable without the interference of a TTP.
